

Historical Case Study: 0.25- μm 64-Mbit DRAM Ramp-up and Pseudo-SRAM (VSRAM)

Shinichi Samizo

Independent Semiconductor Researcher

Project Design Hub, Samizo-AITL

Email: shin3t72@gmail.com GitHub: Samizo-AITL

Abstract—In 1998, a 3rd-generation 64-Mbit DRAM was transferred and ramped on a 0.25- μm process using short-cycle feedback (SCF) and a parallel introduction of production and margin lots. The initial yield was $\sim 65\%$, dominated by retention-related failures under pause-refresh (Bin-5) and disturb-refresh (Bin-6) tests. Process tracing indicated cumulative plasma damage from resist ashing after WSA-ET and multiple LDD steps as a primary root cause. By shifting resist stripping to wet processes and strengthening body back-bias, the yield improved to $\sim 80\%$ and passed long-term reliability.

Building on that platform, a pseudo-SRAM (VSRAM) was mass-produced in 2001 by adding internal refresh control and extending the operating guarantee from 80 to 90 $^{\circ}\text{C}$ for mobile use. Although the initial yield was only $\sim 30\%$, production started as a rational business decision to secure early market entry, and yield improved to 80–90% with continued countermeasures. At the 0.18- μm node, however, trench-capacitor VSRAM failed to meet retention requirements at 90 $^{\circ}\text{C}$ due to larger junction leakage, marking the practical end of 1T-1C pseudo-SRAM evolution. We position this case as a practical ramp-up design framework and an instructive archive linking historical process learning to modern reliability phenomena.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the late 1990s, Japan’s semiconductor industry was in transition. At Epson’s Sakata 8-inch fab, DRAM was *not* pursued as an end business; rather, DRAM technology transfer was used as a **strategic vehicle** to absorb submicron process technologies at and beyond 0.35 μm and redeploy them into Epson’s core devices (ASICs, logic ICs, display drivers, and inkjet driver ICs).

The technology transfer from Mitsubishi covered three nodes, each with a clear role: (1) 0.5 μm 16 Mbit DRAM — to establish mass-production capability and stabilize fab operation; (2) 0.35 μm 64 Mbit DRAM (2nd gen) — to introduce a scaled process while tackling yield window narrowing; (3) 0.25 μm 64 Mbit DRAM (3rd gen) — as the next-stage validation bed and the basis for in-house deployment.

This paper focuses on the 0.25 μm (3rd gen) ramp-up in 1998: a process overview, the ramp-up method, and a failure-analysis-driven yield-improvement cycle. We also trace how these results enabled the 0.25 μm mobile pseudo-SRAM (VSRAM) in 2001 and why trench-based 0.18 μm VSRAM was abandoned.

II. BACKGROUND

This work builds on the author’s 1997–1998 ramp activities at Epson’s Sakata fab under technology transfer from

Mitsubishi; details are summarized in the Introduction and referenced archives.

III. PROCESS OVERVIEW AND RAMP-UP METHOD

A. Process Overview (0.25- μm 64 Mbit DRAM, 3rd Gen)

- **Lithography:** First adoption of a KrF stepper for 0.25- μm volume exposure.
- **Isolation:** Semi-recess LOCOS.
- **Wells:** Triple-well with Deep N-Well to improve cell noise immunity.
- **Word-Line Gate Electrode:** CVD tungsten silicide (WSi). A dielectric **barrier cap (BRAC)** sits atop the WL stack, providing etch robustness and insulation.
- **Bit Line:** *Self-aligned contact* — the bit-line contact and the bit line are formed simultaneously by WSi-CVD; the BRAC blocks contact-to-WL shorts.
- **Storage Node Capacitor:** Stacked capacitor; surface roughening yields $\sim 1.5\text{--}1.8\times$ capacitance gain.
- **Metallization/Passivation:** AlCu/TiN interconnect; SOG planarization; SiN or PI passivation.

B. Ramp-up Method

The node transfer followed a factory-wide, fast-turn scheme:

a) *Base flow:* SCF \rightarrow shape lots \rightarrow production lots:

- 1) **Short Cycle Feedback (SCF):** Each unit process (diffusion, CVD/PVD, etch, etc.) runs short-cycle wafers per its ramp-up spec to quickly evaluate and lock conditions.
- 2) **Shape lots (~ 10 lots):** Provide *real product wafers* to unit teams for items only assessable on full stacks and, in parallel, (i) verify photo CDs, (ii) photo \rightarrow etch CD transfer, and (iii) cross-sections after interlayer films. Recipes are updated for following lots.
- 3) **Production (reliability) lots:** Multiple lots for wafer test and long-term reliability (incl. burn-in) to judge mass-production readiness.

b) *Practical flow (author’s role):* Process conditions (two floppy disks) were received from the mother fab and deployed to unit teams; each team executed SCF and fed back updates. The author consolidated the latest settings into the *electronic traveler*, launched ~ 10 shape lots, fixed target CDs/films, and then ran 5 reliability lots for E-test and reliability signoff.

Pause-Refresh (Bin5) Fail Bit Map — Uniformly Scattered Single-Bit Errors




Fig. 1. Typical fail bit map under pause-refresh test (Bin5). Uniformly scattered single-bit errors are observed without edge/line signatures.

c) *Operations to compress schedule*: Normal lots use stocker \leftrightarrow rail transfer and queue at tools. For critical first-pass lots, we used **hand-carry flow**: engineers delivered cassettes to tools with operators standing by, eliminating transfer/queue loss. Even so, a full pass took about two months; the entire ramp spanned ~ 5 months. Daily morning meetings posted a laminated traveler on a whiteboard to visualize lot progress, schedule slip (in days), and unit-team status. Technical staff also operated in a two-shift scheme (day/night) to sustain 24/7 feedback.

IV. FAILURE ANALYSIS AND YIELD IMPROVEMENT

A. Initial Observation

The first production lots showed $\sim 65\%$ yield. Wafer test was dominated by **Pause Refresh Fail (Bin5)**. Defects appeared as uniformly scattered single-bit errors across the wafer (weak clustering, no edge/line signature). Storage-node capacitance met spec; SEM cross-sections at failed cells revealed no structural anomaly. Other CDs/films/electricals were within spec.

B. Hypothesis (Failure Model)

Directly measurable leakages were normal, suggesting a subtle leakage path. We hypothesized increased leakage at the **storage-node contact n^+/p^- junction**. After gate etch, a remnant gate oxide on S/D active is repeatedly exposed to resist-stripping *ashing* during multiple LDD steps. Cumulative plasma damage makes the oxide locally porous and can extend damage into the diffusion, creating minute leakage paths. This explains random single-bit distribution without visible structural defects.




Fig. 2. Minimal sketch (enlarged): SN contact on n^+ aligned with p^- surface, showing leakage path.




Fig. 3. Yield step improvement at the countermeasure boundary between lot04 and lot05. Yield jumps from $\sim 62\text{--}63\%$ (lot01–lot04) to $\sim 82\text{--}84\%$ (lot05 onward) after changing LDD resist stripping from ashing to wet stripping.

C. Countermeasures

- **Process**: Replace resist stripping in LDD steps from plasma ashing to **wet stripping (sulfuric-based)** to eliminate plasma damage.
- **Integration hygiene**: Confirm downstream photo cleanliness and avoid residue risks with the wet strip.

D. Effectiveness

Yield improved from $\sim 65\%$ to $\sim 80\%$. Uniformly scattered single-bit fails decreased markedly. Burn-in and retention/reliability passed; the final recipe was fixed for volume production.

V. FROM DRAM RAMP TO MOBILE VSRAM (2001)

Around 2000, market focus shifted from PC DRAM to mobile devices. Sharp's camera-phone project demanded **high-density, low-power memory**. Leveraging the $0.25\text{-}\mu\text{m}$ DRAM process, Epson mass-produced a **pseudo-SRAM (VSRAM)** by adding internal refresh control and extending the operating guarantee from 80°C to 90°C for mobile use. Initial yield was only $\sim 30\%$, yet production started as a *rational business decision* to secure market entry, and yield was improved in-flight.

A. Integrated Challenges and Solutions

a) *Pause Refresh under 90°C and extended refresh interval*: To reduce standby current, the internal refresh interval was lengthened; coupled with 90°C spec, junction

leakage limits surfaced. *Process*—building on the DRAM fix—wet stripping replaced ashing; additionally, **minimized HF cleans** preserved gate-oxide residual thickness, mitigating diffusion damage and storage-node contact leakage. *Device bias*—body bias was deepened from -1 V to -3 V to suppress temperature-sensitive leakage while maintaining switching capability.

b) Disturb Refresh at short channel: At $0.25\text{ }\mu\text{m}$, repeated neighboring WL activations aggravated channel disturbance. We tightened **gate CD centering** and optimized **cell-channel doping** to raise V_{th} moderately while keeping access speed; the deeper body bias also helped disturb immunity.

c) Outcome: With these combined actions, yield improved from $\sim 30\%$ at launch to **80–90%** while production continued, and high-temperature reliability was satisfied.

VI. CONCLUSION

The $0.25\text{-}\mu\text{m}$ DRAM ramp at Epson’s Sakata fab demonstrated how DRAM can function as a strategic vehicle to internalize advanced process technologies and redeploy them into core businesses rather than as a direct product line. Rapid SCF-based ramp-up, defect analysis, yield improvement, and verification eliminated a subtle plasma-damage-induced junction leakage and stabilized yield ($\sim 65\% \rightarrow \sim 80\%$).

On that basis, the $0.25\text{-}\mu\text{m}$ VSRAM was mass-produced in 2001 and enabled the world’s first camera-equipped mobile phone. Although launched at only $\sim 30\%$ yield, market entry was prioritized, and subsequent countermeasures improved production yield to 80–90% while sustaining reliability. At $0.18\text{-}\mu\text{m}$, trench-capacitor VSRAM was abandoned because of excessive junction leakage and insufficient $90\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$ retention, exposing the inherent limits of 1T-1C pseudo-SRAM for mobile applications.

Strategically, exiting commodity DRAM competition while retaining acquired process/design/reliability know-how strengthened Epson’s display driver, ASIC, and logic businesses. This case thus provides a concrete template for technology-transfer ramp-ups that prioritize capability acquisition and reuse over direct DRAM commercialization, and it remains a valuable archive and educational resource for modern process engineers.

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Shinichi Samizo received the M.S. degree in Electrical and Electronic Engineering from Shinshu University, Japan. He worked at Seiko Epson Corporation as an engineer in semiconductor memory and mixed-signal device development, and

also contributed to inkjet MEMS actuators and PrecisionCore printhead technology. He is currently an independent semiconductor researcher focusing on process/device education, memory architecture, and AI system integration. **Contact:** shin3t72@gmail.com, Samizo-AITL.